

Based solely on this drawing – since I don’t have a datasheet for the PWM controller depicted – it looks like the potentiometer is there to provide a DC bias for the input Aux signal. I draw that conclusion based on the fact that the potentiometer has its extents connected to Vref and GND, meaning that turning the wiper would be selecting a voltage somewhere in-between those two voltage levels.
As for how this controls the duty cycle of the PWM, it would depend on the operating theory of the PWM controller. I can’t quite imagine how the controller might produce a PWM output, but I can imagine a PDM output, which tends to be sufficient for approximating coarse audio.
But the DC bias may also be necessary since the Aux signal might otherwise try to go below GND voltage. The DC bias would raise the Aux signal so that even its lowest valley would remain above GND.
So I think that’s two reasons for why the potentiometer cannot be removed: 1) the DC bias is needed for the frequency control, and 2) to prevent the Aux signal from sinking below GND.
If you did want to replace the potentiometer with something else, you could find a pair of fixed resistors that would still provide the DC bias. I don’t think you could directly connect the Aux directly into the controller.
Setting aside the cryptographic merits (and concerns) of designing your own encryption, can you explain how a URL redirector requiring a key would provide plausible deniability?
The very fact that a key is required – and that there’s an option for adding decoy targets – means that any adversary could guess with reasonable certainty that the sender or recipient of such an obfuscated link does in-fact have something to hide.
And this isn’t something like with encrypted messaging apps where the payload needs to be saved offline and brute-forced later. Rather, an adversary would simply start sniffing the recipient’s network immediately after seeing the obfuscated link pass by in plain text. What their traffic logs would show is the subsequent connection to the real link, and even if that’s something protected with HTTPS – perhaps https://ddosecrets.com/ – then the game is up because the adversary can correctly deduce the destination from only the IP address, without breaking TLS/SSL.
This is almost akin to why encrypted email doesn’t substantially protect the sender: all it takes is someone to do a non-encryted reply-all and the entire email thread is sent in plain text. Use PGP or GPG to encrypt attachments to email if you must, or just use Signal which Just Works ™ for messaging. We need not reinvent the wheel when it’s already been built. But for learning, that’s fine. Just don’t use it in production or ask others to trust it.