mlfh

Too true. And good on you.

I mean, it’s basically an optional gecos field. That feels a bit like writing off *nix as a whole because /etc/passwd has a place to put your phone number.

Government thugs interrogating me in a Project 2027 concentration camp cell: “we know you gave someone named ‘homeassistant’, born on 1970-01-01, access to your server, now tell use where they are!”

But root can scrape that password as soon as you enter it, and has access to that encrypted data as soon as you decrypt it. That’s what I’m saying.

If you think anything on a *nix system is “safe” from root or a user that can elevate to root, you’re deluding yourself with wishful thinking.

Nothing at all is safe from the root account, or from any user that can elevate to root. Think of the root account as the system itself - the thing you’re trying to protect may be encrypted and safe at rest if you’ve brought it in from elsewhere, but as soon as you enter a password and decrypt it, you’re handing that password and decrypted data over to a system fully controlled by that root account.

According to a study published in 2018, not only the Sunland Baobab, but “the majority of the oldest and largest African baobabs [have died] over the past 12 years”.

Trees that have survived for over a thousand years, all dying together within the span of 12.

Unless there’s more information on what kind of files and what kind or sorting needs to be done, this sounds like something that could be done with a simple shell script.

(I wouldn’t trust an ai agent to do it with accuracy, but I’m the kind of luddite that doesn’t trust an ai agent at all.)

Where Should We Begin? is a podcast by the psychotherapist Esther Perel, where each episode is a full couple’s therapy session with an anonymous couple. It’s nice, and sounds like a match for your question.

From the grapheneos faq section on device support, which details the kinds of hardware and firmware security features required and present on pixels (but may be missing on other devices):

Hardware, firmware and software specific to devices like drivers play a huge role in the overall security of a device. The goal of the project is not to slightly improve some aspects of insecure devices and supporting a broad set of devices would be directly counter to the values of the project. A lot of the low-level work also ends up being fairly tied to the hardware.
Non-exhaustive list of requirements for future devices, which are standards met or exceeded by current Pixel devices:

• Support for using alternate operating systems including full hardware security functionality
• Complete monthly Android Security Bulletin patches without any regular delays longer than a week for device support code (firmware, drivers and HALs)
• At least 5 years of updates from launch for device support code with phones (Pixels now have 7) and 7 years with tablets
• Device support code updated to new monthly, quarterly and yearly releases of AOSP within several months to provide new security improvements (Pixels receive these in the month they’re released)
• Linux 6.1, 6.6 or 6.12 Generic Kernel Image (GKI) support
• Hardware accelerated virtualization usable by GrapheneOS (ideally pKVM to match Pixels but another usable implementation may be acceptable)
• Hardware memory tagging (ARM MTE or equivalent)
• Hardware-based coarse grained Control Flow Integrity (CFI) for baseline coverage where type-based CFI isn’t used or can’t be deployed (BTI/PAC, CET IBT or equivalent)
• PXN, SMEP or equivalent
• PAN, SMAP or equivalent
• Isolated radios (cellular, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC, etc.), GPU, SSD, media encode and decode, image processor and other components
• Support for A/B updates of both the firmware and OS images with automatic rollback if the initial boot fails one or more times
• Verified boot with rollback protection for firmware
• Verified boot with rollback protection for the OS (Android Verified Boot)
• Verified boot key fingerprint for yellow boot state displayed with a secure hash (non-truncated SHA-256 or better)
• StrongBox keystore provided by secure element
• Hardware key attestation support for the StrongBox keystore
• Attest key support for hardware key attestation to provide pinning support
• Weaver disk encryption key derivation throttling provided by secure element
• Insider attack resistance for updates to the secure element (Owner user authentication required before updates are accepted)
• Inline disk encryption acceleration with wrapped key support
• 64-bit-only device support code
• Wi-Fi anonymity support including MAC address randomization, probe sequence number randomization and no other leaked identifiers
• Support for disabling USB data and also USB as a whole at a hardware level in the USB controller
• Reset attack mitigation for firmware-based boot modes such as fastboot mode zeroing memory left over from the OS and delaying opening up attack surface such as USB functionality until that’s completed
• Debugging features such as JTAG or serial debugging must be inaccessible while the device is locked

A fun offshoot down this rabbit hole: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Embarrassingly_parallel

Hahaha no I’m just an idiot and accidentally swapped the url and text, thanks for catching that - fixed now

modprobed-db can create a profile of the kernel modules that get loaded by your system over time. You can feed that directly into make localmodconfig to build a kernel that only includes those modules, or use the data to build a modprobe whitelist.

Sabrina Carpenter 💅

It might yet come back, the page has a banner saying they ran out of storage and the community has donated a bit to add more.

I spun up my own server in the meantime though, and even if sdf does come back, I’ll probably stick to using this one as my primary.

I love lemmy.sdf.org the best - it’s a unixy ragtag underdog cyberpunk kind of place running on a pubnix cluster, whose frequent downtime only adds to its charm. Three-character dot-org domain name (aura). Broad spectrum of users, unified by finding something like a pubnix cluster cool.

Usually the downtime lasts a day or two at most, the plucky pubnix admins get it back online and we celebrate. But it’s been down for over a month now :(

This comment sent me down a fun rabbit hole learning about ARPS and packet radio, and I’m finally gonna get my license now. Thanks!

You have enough failures on each disk to make me suspect an issue with the usb-connected drive bay. I ran into similar issues with a cheap pci-e sata adapter, where little hiccups and latency in the communication layer would cause zfs to take disks offline randomly. Read, write, and checksum errors would slowly accumulate across all of the disks. Switched that machine to a proper enterprise hba, the issues vanished, and the disks are all healthy 3-4 years later.

Islamic cyber resistance to what, snaps?

That’s a really really good story idea, and I love the thought and sentiment behind it - even with my own way of looking at machines, I’d never thought of things that way. You should write it!

I (mostly jokingly, but also a little bit really and sentimentally) believe that physical baremetal computers/servers have souls, and must therefore have hostnames that are names, because names are powerful and soulful and you should have respect for things that have souls. Which is why I kind of hate the “cattle, not pets” model in my own practice.

Stick identifying categorizing prefixes on it, of course, and you can group clusters under the same name with a numeric suffix, but it’s gotta have a real name in there somewhere.